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ABSTRACT: 
This paper is an interlude in three parts: the semiotic, the formal and the problem of the present. It will attempt to 
present an outline as to how the discipline of architecture can find a way to begin to turn away from the variability 
of language as embodied architecture’s nod to the sciences and  towards philosophy. It is concerned directly with 
operative use of philosophy in terms of the act of making as tied into the computational turn. We look to the 
computational turn in architecture as a philosophical problem. This reveals itself in being directly recognised 
as the familiar philosophical problem of the mind and body; or, as it will be discussed here, the subject-object 
problem. The reading of the subject-object problem will agree with the ascertain of Pierre Jacob when he stated 
that perhaps one could derive “intentionality from function and and consciousness from intentionality.” It will 
aim to present us with, as Kipnis ever so poignantly noted in 2007, “the later act” in which we can learn “whether 
Eisenman’s choice ends in comedy or tragedy.” The later act of this paper will put forward the term computational 
craft, a seemingly paradoxical term functioning as an inverse proposition.
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THE LATER ACT 0.0 INTRODUCTION
Anybody who asks, how can we apply the computer to architecture?’ is dangerous, naïve, and 
foolish, because only a foolish person wants to use a tool before he has a reason for needing 
it. He is naïve, because as the thousand clerks have shown us, there is really very little that 
a computer can do, if we do not first enlarge our conceptual understanding of form and 
function. And he is dangerous, because his preoccupation may actually prevent us from 
reading that conceptual understanding, and from seeing problems as they really are.1
            -Christopher Alexander
I have a confession to make. 
I am not interested in architecture. 
This may sound like a strange statement for my colleagues to hear, as after all, according to my 
resume (a great indication of the paradoxes one holds hidden in their history), it seems I have been 
consistently only interested in architecture. And, to those who have many decades of experience to 
my one, one can only assume 
that I must sound disillusioned and naïve. 
The first time I said this to anyone was close to a year ago, and, as any self-respecting woman in her 
late twenties does, to my mother over dinner during one of my rare trips to my parent’s house. 
“Ma, I don’t think I am interested in architecture anymore.” 
She stared at me blankly. I tried to explain. She eventually told me to stop talking and, as any mother 
does, to do the dishes. I obliged, begrudgingly and defeated.
I’ve come to know that blank stare rather well in the last twelve months. I received it when I said 
that very statement to my teaching partner, to my boss as he read the first draft of this paper, and to 
the AA’s janitor who I’ve found myself having late-night debates with in recent months. I received a 
very mysterious smile from my mentor, who told me only one word in response: ‘Enjoy’. And now, 
I say it to you.
ARCC 2011 | Considering Research: Reflecting upon current themes in Architecture Research596
I am not interested in architecture. Let me explain.
The state of architecture in the twenty-first century has been primarily concerned with the unfortunate 
circumstantial philosophical leftovers of the overlap and paralleling of a phenomenological framework 
with – as embodied in theoretical practice only – a radical neo-Kantian interpretation by Foucault. 
While we do not wish to spend much time pondering such known and read philosophical writings, 
we do need to recognise their relevance to the twenty-first century. The resultant topography of this 
condition is one which has been encouraged by a growing relationship between architecture – not 
architects – and language. While this is not unknown, the first protagonists of this Post-modernism 
emerged out of a consistent effort to free architecture from meanings derived from within and out of 
Classicism and Modernism. This effort produced arbitrary objects of architecture, removed entirely 
from cultural meaning. The subject2 became the controlling and originating agent of meaning.3 With 
the advent of new technologies there simultaneously arrived the computational turn; the language of 
code and of endless formation which is removed from signification entirely.
My interest lies in clarifying the problematic muddled under this resultant indifference. It recognizes 
that, to blatantly rip from The Dude – and this paper will not apologize for this reference – the 
‘royal we’4 [see endnote] has become profoundly apathetic towards the origin of meaning, in favor of the 
infinite multiplicity and variation allowed us by a growing reliance on technology. Any interest in 
architecture – especially as a material, object-based practice – is happenstance, rather than fraught 
with a sense of self-aware causality. My lack of interest in architecture is not only circumstantial of 
my generation, but demanded for by the need to disconnect from a practice of architectural theory 
less concerned with the intentionality behind the object itself than with the multiplicity of form(s) 
and variations of meaning. 
This paper aims to denounce the meaninglessness that was sought in the work of Eisenman, 
established in the infinite variation of Lynn’s blobs, and further developed in the ‘softness’ of Kwinter, 
which has pervaded its remains into the inner crevices of the architecture and architectural theory 
of the twenty-first century. It carries with it a grand umbrella in favour of an interrogation of the 
present lack of application of philosophy in architecture. This is very different than being interested 
in architecture. This is also very much the opposite of being interested in architectural theory. 
This paper is an interlude in three parts: the semiotic, the formal and the problem of the present. It 
will attempt to present an outline as to how the discipline of architecture can find a way to begin to 
turn away from the variability of language as embodied in architecture’s nod to the sciences and back 
to philosophy. On a more familiar level, it is concerned directly with operative use of philosophy in 
terms of the act of making as tied into the computational turn. We shall see the computational turn 
not as a architectural paradigm shift, but a beginning of a philosophical one, as formulated through 
the subject-object problem. 
One may wonder as to the relevance of the broadened scope presented in this paper. This was 
done purposefully. The later act of this paper will begin to formulate a means to go forward in 
computational craft, a seemingly paradoxical term functioning as an inverse proposition. One should 
hope that these are not construed as the words of a cynic, but auspiciously working towards a specific 
practice of architecture. I am not interested in architecture purely because architecture has become 
too superficial and regurgitated to be interesting. It will aim to present us with, as Kipnis ever so 
poignantly noted in 2007, “the later act” in which we can learn “whether Eisenman’s choice ends in 
comedy or tragedy.”5
INTERLUDE 1.0 THE SEMIOTIC
When the origination of a concept is studied, the subject – the thinker, in this case, the architect – 
and object – the thing itself, form, or in this case, the object of architecture – are maintained in a 
mediation. This can be traced back in philosophy to Kant. Foucault presented this in the following 
way:
The question which seems to me to appear for the first time in this text by Kant is the question 
of the present, of the contemporary moment. What is happening today? What is happening 
now? And what is this ‘now’ which we all inhabit, and which defines the moment in which I 
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am writing? […] Now it seems to me that the question Kant answers […] has to do 
with what this present is […] The question is: what is there in the present which can 
have contemporary meaning for philosophical reflection.6 
The question of the present can be perceived to be the downfall of all architecture theory since 
Modernism, when classical forms were representative of their function and their historical meaning. 
The relationship between the subject and object was formal. 
The subject and object do not negate each other as the potentiality embodied within the  act of 
making is mediated. For example, the meaning of the verb to compute oscillates pending the presence 
of an object, from abstract to concrete. The potentiality of computation therefore is determined by 
the mediated presence of either subject or object. Meaning is varied. This variation in meaning is our 
site of investigation. It is this hesitation, this moment of pause, which gives rise to the inevitability of 
the insertion of language into a philosophical playing ground. 
The linguistic sign, as it was argued for by Ferdinand de Saussure, is dualistic in that it is made up of 
two entities – the signifier and the signified.7 The sign, as a result of the signifier and signified therefore 
becomes recognised as the object of linguistics. However, we must recognise that this is a devolution 
away from the seeming physicality of the Kantian structure of the subject and object, and in doing 
so, does not necessitate the presence of an object. Instead, in Saussure’s semiotic model the subject 
becomes primary, for not only does the subject originate the concept, but the subject originates the 
sound pattern – or material element, as Saussure refers to it, as well. This material element, as being 
related directly to representations of experience,8 is most important to our discussion, and will be 
brought back later in this paper.
There is a correspondence in this oscillation between sign and signifier which enables variations 
of types of signs. This is referred to by Saussure as the first principle, which states that the sign is 
arbitrary.9 It is the state of being arbitrary that is the most basic truth to the nature of semiotics 
and of the sign, which, as Saussure puts it, is “arbitrary in relation to its signification”.10 The second 
principle of the sign is in regards to the signal, or the object in Saussure’s semiotic structure. The 
signal cannot exist in three-dimensional space, as it is temporal. It is only but a line,or occupies only 
one dimension.11 It is an auditory, not visual symbol. We can only understand these signals as being 
part of a series, and “have available to them only the linearity of time”12 The one-dimensional nature 
of the sign shows itself immediately when they are representing through the act of writing. The sign is 
the product of a phenomenological experience, and yet, consequentially, is removed one step further 
than phenomenology from physical actuality in three dimensions.
There are several assertions which can be made in light of Saussure’s conclusions and the previous 
content of this paper. One is that the connection to architecture can only be understood as a tertiary 
condition to language – as one understood primarily through the subject, not the object. This is 
because architecture holds a function outside of its form-making process, and therefore outside of 
the subject-object problem in semiotics, as well as being physically unable to be found in the third 
dimension. However, the sign can fulfill the 4th dimension, primarily when considering mathematics. 
This is an important concept and one which is an underlying investigation threaded, ever so carefully, 
through the thesis of this paper. When one frames the lack of a direct behavioural element of the 
sign in light of the sign managing to be comprehended in terms of a 4th dimension, and the other 
disappointingly obvious and ignored condition – that of the material element of the sign – we find a 
linguistic principle which fails to relate at all to physical form. The subject and object are broken free 
from a directly mediated structure. This can, however, enable a relationship between mathematics, 
biology and metaphorical time. We are now – if we consider the ‘we’ presented in this paper as the 
linguistic signal – able to contribute to a representation of the 4th dimension (a-physical) with an 
apathy towards exteriorities (a-historical). 
It is here that we find ourselves in the presence of a perfect number of excuses for the application 
of a semiotic function to architecture. The linguistic sign determines that any object must by 
necessity have signification assigned to it through an intellectual disciplining, since it is a-physical 
and a-historical. The subject-object relationship here becomes entirely bound by the capacity of the 
subject to respond only to linear temporalities, and thus cannot remain architectural when thought 
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of as in this structure. The mistake is that this intellectual disciplining has latched onto mathematics, 
time, and as a result has looked to superficial formulations of variability in the sciences for meaning 
and essence. I do not say this to oversimplify the intellectual efforts of post-Modernism in so far 
as set the stage for a seeming misappropriation of the sign into architectural discourse. However, I 
do say this to confirm the cautious statement of Silvetti, when he stated that “the use of metaphor 
in architecture, as in any practice, should be looked at as an enrichment of meaning and not as a 
replacement for the thing itself.”13 One could say that this is setting the stage for the latter part of 
the later act.
INTERLUDE 2.0 THE FORMAL
The application of the linguistic sign to comprehend form can be traced through the palimpsest of 
architecture to Egyptian hieroglyphics which were used to literally impart mythological time as an 
ingredient in the problem of modernity. We again see the imposition of the sign in Classicism and 
again in Modernism. The linguistic sign presents a radical notion of tradition, which when found 
in the architecture of Classicism, is found as a representation of a continued antiquity. The Greek 
orders – Doric, Ionic, Corinthian – are a most obvious presentations of this. Their architectural forms 
are types of the same element. They perform the same function, yet their forms are arbitrary within 
that certain historicised function. Saussure confirmed this himself with stating; “the individual has 
no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has become established.”14
This is promptly interrogated by Eisenman in his theorisation of the lack of capacity of Modern 
architecture to break from historical conditions and meaning. This is done primarily through the 
recognition that Modernism never fully was able to break away from earliest manifestations of 
its representational tradition, recognised as abstraction. However, this abstraction is specific in its 
relationship to a pure function. It is the language of the function, which Eisenman referred to in 
his essay “The End of the Classical, The End of the Beginning, The End of the End” (1984) as 
the “message of utility” – that actually acts similarly to the historical representation of antiquity in 
Classicism.15
The subject becomes removed from the object of architecture in terms of any historical representation, 
thus bringing into the Modernist discuss the moment of modernity and its value outside of form – its 
function. As Michael Hays stated, 
In Eisenman’s view, modern architecture was never fully modern. Though it did produce a  
certain opacity of the architectural sign […]  modern architecture was never really free of 
the burden to mean; the referent still survives, albeit problematically, in cherished modernist 
emblems like the industrial shed, grain silo, and steamship, their workmanlike materials and 
their social utility.16 
The craft embedded in the utility and function of Modernism could have been the shovel of dirt on 
Eisenman’s theoretical grave. We find ourselves in the position of confronting Eisenman’s continued 
foray into displacing meaning from the object, despite a indication that the failures of Modernism 
to break from the subject of history could perhaps signify a need to respond to the encouragingly 
superficial nature of the production of Modernist objects of architecture from the point of view of 
their craft. 
Instead, Eisenman latched onto the linguistic model as the way into the search for an architecture 
of autonomy from meaning. The object of architecture became a result of a purely linguistic system 
of architecture which cannot embody any sense of meaningfulness, reason, or time. The subject, 
ultimately, becomes the sign, and signifier of meaning, or lack thereof. Form, as Eisenman stated, 
becomes; 
understood as a series of fragments – signs without meaning dependent upon, and without 
reference to, a more basic condition.17
This coincidentally does not take into consideration the linguistic truth that signs can never be 
removed by the subject from their established set of meaning. The ‘basic condition’, as Eisenman 
refers to it, can only be understood in this paper as the condition of self-aware consciousness and 
causality; of being human. The potentiality between the subject and object is unfortunately negated 
through the insertion of the arbitrary linguistic sign.18
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One could posit that this describes, in a roundabout manner, the negation of the following: a 
collective consciousness (as determined by Kant), the inscription of function, as well as the notion 
of time in the third dimension (and therefore a reliance on the linearity of the sign), and the partial 
appropriation of a philosophical framework as a metaphor for architectural discourse. Through 
the application of a semiotic systemic, the object, which is no longer of architecture, is presented 
only through its own codification. Architecture is seen here as dissolved through a coloured lens of 
philosophy which activated the arbitrary linguistic sign as a means of ordering our world.
INTERLUDE 3.0 PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT
And what a sudden, frightening abyss it opened up in front of us as the computer certainly 
intimated that it could produce forms that not only do not have precedent, but, more 
perplexing, may not even have referents! Freedom from semantics, history, and culture was 
perhaps made possible for the first time in civilization.19
       -Jorge Silvett
Form in the digital world exists in a 4th dimensional location, one who is removed from the third 
dimension entirely. The arrival of digital objects into architectural discourse seemingly completes 
the a-signification so desperately looked for in post-Modern semiotic theory. And, in keeping in 
mind that what Saussure originally stated was characteristic of a temporal problem of the present, 
this mode of productivity was diagnosed in a linear manner, from master to apprentice, Eisenman 
to Lynn.
The language of the sign finds itself being replicated by, or corresponding to, the language of code. 
However, the exception found within code is that it is able to correspond beyond the linearity of 
the arbitrary sign, which must be read through a linear series. The language of code has the capacity 
to, as Greg Lynn has informed us by reformulating a computationally-minded position out of the 
Eisenman tradition, taking a perspective on the very same shift that Eisenman attempted to outline 
in his essay referred to earlier;
Architectural form is conventionally conceived in a dimensional space of idealise stasis, defined 
by Cartesian fixed-point coordinates. An object defined as a vector whose trajectory is relative 
to other objects, forces, fields and flors, defines form within an active space of force and 
motion. This shift from a passive space of static coordinates to an active space of interactions 
implies a move  from autonomous purity to contextual specificity.20
This vector-based model is formulated through empirical, mathematical principles, yet has subjected 
(by the subject) onto its form – or object – the perception that the principle can be read through 
a language of an arbitrary and varied nature. The object is formed solely by the forces which are 
dictated to it by the capacity of the technology. The ‘blob’, as it was so keenly named, was the result 
of this investigation. It’s ultimate variation: determined only by its form, with no implied meaning 
of the subject. It, I would argue, had no material-based object-hood beyond a diluted and implicit 
linguistic structure. There is no potentiality between the subject and object because the relationship 
between them has been dissolved. 
Although it seems to be here in the computational turn that we achieve the a-signified object, we 
can see in the work of Sanford Kwinter. In so far as Klee’s Angelus Novus represented progress for 
Benjamin, the blob represented a death of philosophy in architecture, although it did not present the 
death of theory, as evident in Kwinter’s writing. As digital form became increasingly less material, the 
technological system which authored it (i.e. the opposite of enabling the potentiality of the subject-
object relationship) began to be the focus of the subject. Architecture here is negated, it is a-material, 
it is soft.21
The computational processes of the act of making became central, facilitating the entrance of analogies 
and metaphors from outside the traditional architectural discourse, and finding root in mathematics 
and the natural sciences. The production of form was systematised. This signified for Kwinter the 
potential to break further from the types of Modernism or the fragments of post-Modernism, for 
their philosophical linearity is superseded by the capacity  and potentiality for a non-linear system. 
Rather than being a product of a relationship between the subject and object, potentiality is now
engrained within a system.
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We now must look briefly to the computational turn in architecture as a philosophical problem. 
This reveals itself in being directly recognised as the familiar philosophical problem of the mind and 
body; or, has it has been discussed here, the subject-object problem. The reading of the subject-object 
problem finds itself agreeing with the ascertain of Pierre Jacob when he stated that perhaps one could 
derive “intentionality from function and and consciousness from intentionality.”22
One may have found it easy to forget by this point in this paper that in Modernism’s interrogation 
of the Classical, and post-Modernism’s argument out of Modernism, both negated the influence 
of intentionality on the making process or in the relationship between the subject and object. This 
indicates that there are several eccentricities implicit in the work discussed here that has come out of 
these paradigm shifts which remain to be challenged in only the most superficial of interrogations. 
Let’s lay it these on the table, shall we? This paper’s commitment to the task of returning to the 
philosophical origin must be concealed through the very act it aims to dissipate. This act – the act 
of theorising – enables us to see the failure of our own reason. We aim to ignore our capacity for 
a Kantian collective consciousness, which is so naturally embedded within our abilities to cognate 
potential and intention to the point that we can actively rationalise philosophical distance for the sake 
of the problem of the present. 
However, there could be a way out of the dire apathy for origin, material, form, causality and 
meaning without having to reconcile with the established distance from the subject and object. 
This is not to deny the importance of our understanding of principles of computation nor argue 
against our use of technology in the production of architecture, nor to negate the work which 
arrived prior. Rather, it is here that I would like to suggest the term computational craft, a seemingly 
paradoxical term functioning as an inverse proposition. We can see this in a few ways. Primarily, 
one can clearly see that due to and after post-Modernism, we have been unable to comprehend our 
incapacity to concede to our own humanity. This does not mean to sound prolific, but one must 
suggest that a slightly alarmed tone is taken primarily due to being shocked at the underdevelopment 
of the following in philosophy and architecture. It is from Kant that we gain an interest in the first 
principles of a mathematical, empirical world, but it is also from Kant that we recognise language as 
a metaphysical sense. 
This becomes an inherent contradiction of an application of philosophy to architecture, for finding 
architectural form within the problem of the present finds that philosophy in a linear sense is 
exhausted. There must be a return to the Humanist standpoint that there is a material element to the 
world which cannot be denied. It is not that I wish to continue to find architecture uninteresting. 
However, it is in the presentation of a neo-Humanist position in reaction to the apathetic disclosure 
of architecture to a scientific model which emerged from a semiotic model that we find a devastatingly 
certain closure to Eisenman’s tragedy.
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